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 Abstract 
 
Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, material support of terrorism charges have 
served as a cornerstone in the U.S. Government’s fight against terrorism. However, empirical 
research looking at the usage of material support charges is lacking. The primary focus of this 
study is to determine if material support charges are related to increases in terrorist attack 
success and scale. Using the American Terrorism Study (ATS), 177 post-9/11 Islamic Extremist-
linked court cases including material support charges and 140 terrorist incidents were coded and 
analyzed using chi-square, logistical regression, and linear regression models. Results revealed 
that material support charges are related to decrease in the likelihood of incident success due to 
the presence of human intelligence sources while increasing the potential or actual scale of 
incidents through the number of participants. In conclusion, the material support of terrorism 
charge remains to be a highly controversial charge that is often used when human intelligence 
sources are present in an investigation, but is not related to increases in incident success.
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, targeting and disrupting material support 
for terrorist organizations has been a cornerstone of the United States' counterterrorism policy 
and the war on terrorism (Cole, 2003). The USA PATRIOT Act (USAPA) and other laws have 
provided new powers to law enforcement and the intelligence community in investigating and 
prosecuting terrorist groups and individuals. Although several terrorist attacks have been carried 
out in the United States since 9/11, many more have been thwarted as a result of law 
enforcement intervention efforts (Dahl, 2011). While government officials and agencies often 
tout thwarted terrorist plots as victories, little is known about the underlying nature of these plots 
or how they are investigated (Gruenewald et al., 2016). Despite recent studies by Smith (2016) 
and Gruenewald et al. (2016) looking at factor impacting incident success, there is a shortage of 
research examining the link between material support of terrorism charges and how they relate to 
violent plots (Sullivan, Freilich, Chermak, 2014). 
This is an important avenue of researcher considering that material support of terrorism 
charges have been the most widely used federal terrorism charges in terrorism-related court cases 
(Patel & Tierney, 2015; Center for Law and Security, 2011). Furthermore, Sullivan, Freilich, and 
Chermak (2014) found that approximately 25% of material support and other financing charges 
were linked to incidents. Knowing that an identified link between material support charges and 
violent incidents has been established, additional research examining the extent of this 
relationship is warranted. Thus, the primary goal of the current study is to examine how terrorist 
incidents involving material support charges differ from non-material support-linked incidents. 
For this purpose, I will investigate the following research question: Does material support 
influence the likelihood of success for violent incidents or plots? Another important research 
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question, concerning the impact of material support charges on the scale of incidents, is: Does 
material support impact the potential or actual scale of violent incidents or plots?  
 The current study plays an important role in addressing existing gaps within the material 
support literature, specifically the role material support plays in terrorism incidents. The 
following section will outline the formation of the material support statute as well as some 
controversies surrounding the charges.  
Material Support Background 
In 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) was enacted in 
response to the 1993 World Trade Center and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombings. One of the 
provisions outlined in the AEDPA was the designation of foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) 
– as determined by the U.S. Department of State – with the aim of denying these FTOs the 
necessary ingredients for planning and carrying out attacks (DeRosa, 2005; Giraldo & Trinkunas, 
2007). The ban on supporting FTOs grew out of concerns held by U.S. Congressional members 
who believed terrorist organizations were actively engaged in raising funds within the United 
States through charitable or humanitarian organizations to further domestic and international 
terrorist activities. Following the 9/11 attacks, the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) primary focus 
shifted to disrupting terrorist plots and dismantling terrorist organizations by restricting the flow 
of funds and other material support or resources to terrorists (Taxay, 2014). The USA PATRIOT 
Act (USAPA) was also passed in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, vastly expanding the 
investigatory and prosecutorial reach of the government in detecting, preventing, investigating, 
and prosecuting terrorists (Department of Justice, 2005), while also improving information 
sharing among law enforcement and the intelligence community (Manget, 2002). Additionally, 
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the USAPA expanded the definition of FTOs to include groups of two or more individuals, 
whether organized or not, engaging in selected terrorist activities (Van Bergen, 2004). 
     While the original terrorism financing statute, 18 USC § 2339A, was enacted in 1994 and 
prohibited persons from knowingly providing material support or resources to be used in the 
preparation or carrying out of terrorist attacks (Taxay, Schneider, and Didow, 2014), the USAPA 
broadened the definition of the material support statute and paved the way for it becoming the 
cornerstone in post 9/11 prosecutions (DeRosa, 2005; McNulty, 2006). In United States v. Sattar 
(2002), the United States Second Circuit Court of Appeals considered the new definition of 
“material support or resources” and held it to include “any property, tangible or intangible, or 
service, including expert advice, training, personnel, lodging, documents, money, transportation 
or financial services other than medicine or religious materials.” This language helped broaden 
the scope of the material support statute while also painting it with intentionally plain and 
ambiguous language (McNulty, 2006). 
Controversy Surrounding Material Support 
 Despite concerns surrounding the broad reach of the material support statute, the U.S. 
Supreme Court upheld the statute’s broad prohibition in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project 
(2010), noting that any support to an FTO, even for peaceful means, “frees up other resources 
within the organization that may be put to violent ends” and “legitimizes terrorist groups – 
legitimacy that makes it easier for those groups to persist, to recruit members, and to raise funds 
– all of which facilitate more terrorist attacks.” The Supreme Court further noted that Congress 
purposefully weakened language in the material support statute, rendering no meaningful 
separation between legal and illegal support (Greenberg and Quantrone, 2011). Because of this, 
the federal material support statute has allowed the government to secure convictions without 
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having to show that any specific act of terrorism has taken place, is being planned, or even that a 
defendant intended to further terrorism (Jaffer and Wizner, 2008). This net widening, or 
expansion of law enforcement reach, has resulted in the material support statute being the most 
commonly used charge in terrorism court cases since 2009 (Greenberg and Quantrone, 2011). 
Not surprisingly, the broad scope of material support statutes has resulted in a 
multifaceted political debate over the constitutionality of the charge. Critics have been quick to 
point out that the statutes challenge one’s First Amendment rights to freedom of assembly, press, 
religion, and speech by criminalizing activities such as the distribution of literature, engaging in 
political advocacy, and donating money for humanitarian assistance, even when the support is 
intended for non-violent and lawful activities, so long as the organization or group has been 
designated as a FTO (Landman, 2010). An example of this can be seen in the Department of 
Justice’s recent focus on the Somalian-based FTO, Al-Shabaab, which has resulted in the 
indictment of over forty individuals for providing support to the overseas group that was only 
designated a FTO as recently as 2008 (Greenberg and Quantrone, 2011). 
 Questions surrounding the usage of material support charges and the role they play in the 
United States’ fight against terrorism has led to increased interest in studying the charges. 
The following chapter will outline some previous empirical findings surrounding the use of 
material support in court cases and the potential link to violent plots or incidents. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 LITERATURE 
 
Material Support Frequency 
 
 As previously mentioned, federal prosecutors use of material support charges has 
increased dramatically in recent years, making them the most frequently used terrorism charges 
and a cornerstone in counterterrorism policy (Patel & Tierney, 2015; Abrams, 2010; Said, 2011; 
Skinner, 2012; Center for Law and Security, 2011; Cole, 2003). An analysis of jihadist-inspired 
terrorism cases by the Center on Law and Security at New York University (2011) confirmed 
this, finding that the use of material support charges in terrorism-related cases increased from 
11.6% of cases in 2007 to 69.4% in 2010. The recent introduction of terrorist organizations, such 
as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)1, has also led to a rise in the use of material support 
charges, with 71 out of 79 ISIS-related prosecutions between March 1, 2014, and February 12, 
2016, involving at least one material support charge (Center on National Security at Fordham, 
2016).  
Material Support Convictions and Sentencing 
 One reason for the increased frequency of material support charges is in part due to the 
increased likelihood of defendants entering a guilty plea when charged with material support 
compared to those not charged with material support (Parrot et al., 2008). With a statutory 
maximum of twenty years’ imprisonment (or life imprisonment if the crime results in the death 
of any person) and a $250,000 fine, individuals convicted of material support often receive 
sentences eight times longer than defendants not charged with terrorism or national security 
charges (Center on Law and Security, 2011). This is in large part due to the label of “terrorism” 
                                                
1 Also known as Islamic State (IS or as the Islamic State or Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). For the 
purpose of this report, I will refer to persons or incidents affiliated with this group as ISIS. 
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that encompasses the charge and the prosecution associating individuals to a specific terrorist 
group and their extremist ideologies (Parrott et al., 2008). 
Material Support being Ideologically Driven 
Sullivan, Freilich, and Chermak (2014) were the first to link the charge to violent 
incidents, discovering that in 98 material support schemes and 52 financial schemes linked to the 
Al-Qaeda and Affiliate Movements (AQAM), 97% of the individuals involved in the schemes 
were ideologically motivated. However, despite perpetrators ideologically identifying with a 
terrorist group, only 50% had a direct association to an actual terrorist organization, while 33% 
had an indirect connection, and 17% were non-extremist collaborators.  
Increasing Role of Confidential Informants and Undercover Agents 
 
 As previously mentioned, the use of confidential informants (CIs) or undercover agents 
(UCAs) (hereinafter referred collectively as “human intelligence”) in terrorism-related 
investigations has been a growing area of interest for researchers. The increased utilization of 
human intelligence in terrorism-related investigations is, in part, a result of the post-9/11 
aggressive approach the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) has taken. This approach has 
been described as being an "aggressive, proactive, and preventative" strategy, aimed at 
identifying possible terrorists "at the earliest stage possible with preventative prosecutions" 
(McNulty, 2006). This preventative strategy includes "identifying not only individuals engaged 
in terrorist activity, but also those, who if approached, would agree to participate or support 
terrorism" (Center on Law and Security, 2011, p.4). As a result, nearly 50% of all terrorism-
related cases since 2009 and 58% post-9/11 Islamic Extremist-linked cases have involved the use 
of human intelligence, becoming the primary method for thwarting potential violent terrorist 
attacks (Gruenewald et al., 2016; Norris and Grol-Prokopzyk, 2017). Furthermore, Norris and 
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Grol-Prokopzyk (2017) found that out of 580 post-9/11 terrorism prosecutions, an astonishing 
55% involved human intelligence prior to any crime being committed. One of the most popular 
human intelligence operations the government has applied, referred to as a “sting operation,” 
involves potential terrorism suspects being contacted and offering some sort of assistance or 
guidance in planning or preparing for a terrorist attack (Greenberg and Quantrone, 2011). A 
study by Dahl (2011) found that law enforcement intervention through human intelligence is 
present in many thwarted plots, with nearly 40 percent of terrorist plots being foiled by public 
tips or confidential informants alone (Strom et al., 2010). Despite these foiled plots being viewed 
as victories by counterterrorism officials, questions surrounding these investigative techniques 
have raised concerns by some civil rights advocacy groups, who questioned whether some of 
these plots were actually manufactured by law enforcement and if entrapment techniques were 
present (Gruenewald et. al, 2016). Questions about entrapment often stem from government 
informants resorting to “astonishing” measures to persuade individuals to engage in terrorism, 
including job offers, promising large sums of money, threatening to harm individuals who back 
out, and playing an active role in radicalizing them (e.g. United States v. Shareef, 2006). In many 
sting operations, government agents – not the perpetrator – have provided the means needed to 
commit terrorist acts (e.g. providing bombs or other weapons) that individuals would have been 
unable to acquire on their own (Aaronson, 2013). 
 Critics have reasoned that increased pressure on confidential informants (CIs) and 
undercover agents (UCAs) to generate convictions in terrorism investigations in order to justify 
the FBI’s vast counterterrorism budget has led to an increase in manufactured plots and cases 
(German, 2013). Despite the questionable role human intelligence has had in terrorism-related 
investigations since 9/11, no entrapment defense has ever been successful in blocking a terrorism 
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conviction (Bernstein, 2010). Despite previous research looking at the frequency and controversy 
of human intelligence operations, there is a lack of research examining the relationship between 
material support charges and human intelligence. 
Material Support and Violent Plots 
Finally, when it comes to linking material support cases to planned or completed terrorist 
attacks, Sullivan, Freilich, and Chermak (2014) were the first to discover that 20% of the cases 
they analyzed from the Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) were linked to violent attacks or plots 
in the United States or overseas (Sullivan, Freilich, and Chermak, 2014). While their findings 
established a foundation, additional research is required to answer how material support 
influences these linked incidents in regards to their scale and success. Previous research by 
Smith et. al. (2016) established that the number of participants, preparatory activities, planning 
cycle, and weapon sophistication involved in an incident all impact the likelihood of incident 
success, but did not examine all factors impacting incident outcomes. Specifically, little is known 
about what factors impact the number of participants or weapon sophistication in an incident. 
While it is already well established that the acquisition of materials and support are key elements 
in the planning, attack, and evasion phases of an incident (Smith, 2008), there has been no 
research looking at how material support relates to the success or scale of an incident. 
Research Questions 
 
As discussed above, a significant gap remains in the research concerning material support 
charges and how they are related to violent incidents. To address this gap, the current study will 
examine the following research question: Does the presence of material support increase the 
success or potential scale for violent incidents? In order to answer this question, it is important 
to first operationalize the terms “scale” and “success” as they apply to terrorist incidents. 
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Prominent terrorism databases such as the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) have quantified 
fatalities, injuries, and damages in an attempt to measure the scale of an incident. Since the 
current study includes successful and unsuccessful incidents, not all incidents had a measurable 
amount of damage or injuries. Therefore, this study will utilize variables from the American 
Terrorism Study (ATS) database to measure scale for both planned and completed incidents. 
Specifically, the current study examines weapon sophistication and the number of perpetrators 
involved in the planning, preparation, or carrying out of incidents. While not complete 
measurements of scale, they do cover an aspect of the potential or actual scale of an incident and 
have already been found to influence the likelihood of success for an incident (Smith, 2016). 
Incident success also uses variables from the ATS, which defines incidents as successful when 
weapons are successfully delivers to the intended target. Incidents are coded as unsuccessful if 
the incident failed to occur due to plot cancellation, weapon failure, or human intervention. 
Incidents are also coded as partially successful, but were labeled as successful for the purpose of 
this study.2 
It already established that material acquisition and support are key elements in the 
planning, attack, and evasion phases of an incident (Smith, 2008) and that, according to resource 
mobilization theory, a group’s ability to successfully mobilize resources is an important factor in 
being successful (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004; McCarthy & Zald, 1977). If material acquisition 
and support are key in terrorism incidents and group success, an important question to ask is 
whether material support is related to the success of terrorist incidents. Using the presence of 
material support of terrorism charges to measure material support, I propose the following 
hypothesis: 
                                                
2 For additional definitions for incident success categories, refer to Appendix A. 
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H1: Material Support-linked violent plots are more likely to be successful than 
non-material support-linked violent plots. 
 
 Following in line with my first research question is the follow-up question of how 
material support charges may or may not be related to the potential scale of an incident. Smith 
(2016) established that both the number of participants and weapon sophistication influence the 
outcome of incidents, but did not examine what impacts the scale of an incident. Since material 
support includes providing material or personnel support, the relationship material support 
charges have with scale was tested. To test this, the following hypothesis was proposed: 
H2: Material support-linked violent plots will have a larger potential scale than 
non-material support-linked violent plots. 
 
Next, I will discuss how these research questions were tested. The following chapter 
provides a description of the data and methodology employed to examine these hypotheses. I 
will begin by outlining my data source, my case inclusion criteria, operationalized variables, and 
the type of analysis performed.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
American Terrorism Study 
 
Primary data was derived from the American Terrorism Study Database (ATS), which 
contains information on persons federally indicted in the United States as a result of “terrorism 
or terrorism-related activities” for the period 1980-present. Since the FBI has exclusive 
jurisdiction over the investigation of acts of terrorism against U.S. citizens or property and has 
previously provided names of individuals indicted in terrorism-related court cases to the ATS, 
the ATS utilizes the FBI’s definition of terrorism as: “the unlawful use of force and violence 
against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any 
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2005, p. IV). As of February 2017, the ATS database contains over 1,400 
terrorism-related court cases and 600 identified terrorist plots3 or incidents. 
Inclusion Criteria 
 Potential material support-linked court cases were identified by gathering a list of all 
individuals federally charged with one or more material support of terrorism charge(s). To ensure 
the integrity of the included cases, professionally published lists and official Departmental of 
Justice (DOJ) lists were cross-checked with a list of indictees in the ATS charged with material 
support of terrorism. Court records for these individuals were then collected from the Public 
Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) website and added to the ATS database.  
Information contained within available court documents was then coded into variables in the 
                                                
3 Incidents and plots are identified as having at least one preparatory act in the form or 
planning or preparing to commit a violent terrorist act. Refer to Smith et al. (2016) for further 
explanation. 
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ATS database. When certain case information was not readily available in court documents, 
credible online sources were used to code missing variables and fill any gaps in information. In 
total, 177 court cases containing at least one material support charge as well as 407 material 
support indictees between 2000 and January 2017 were included in the final sample. 
Table 1: Characteristics of Material Support Court Cases in the Sample 
 N %    
Group      
 MS     
AQAM  64 36.2%    
ISIS 113 63.8%    
Total 177 100.0    
 
Number of Indictees   
   
1 Indictee 109 61.6%    
2-3 Indictees 40 22.6%    
4 or more 28 15.8%    
Total 177 100.0    
      
Overall Counts      
1 count 39 22.0%    
2-3 counts 56 31.6%    
3-4 counts 36 20.3%    
5 or more 46 26.0%    
Total 177 100.0    
      
Indictees Gender 
           MS  
 Other Islamic 
Extremists 
Male 373 91.6%  295 93.1% 
Female 30 7.4%  16 5.0% 
Company/Organization 4 1.0%  6 1.9% 
Total 407 100.0  317 100.0 
      
Indictee Age4 X̅ Median    
Material Support 31.6 29.5    
Non-Material Support 38.2 36    
 
                                                
4   Represents the mean and median age of indictees on the date of their arrest. 
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Table 1 provides a descriptive outline of the material support court cases and indictees 
sample. There was little difference in gender between material support and non-material support 
indictees5 with 92% and 93%, respectfully, being male. There was, however, a noticeable 
difference in the mean and median ages for material support and non-material support indictees; 
material support indictees have a median age of 29.5 compared to 36 for non-material support. 
With the emergence of ISIS in 2013, following the decline of Al Qaeda in Iraq, I believed it to be 
prudent to examine the subcategories of Islamic Extremism separately in order to determine 
whether patterns of material support differed between the two. Unlike Sullivan et al., (2014), I 
wanted to look at Al Qaeda-inspired terrorists (AQAM)6 separately from ISIS and found that 
ISIS court cases made up well over half (64%) of the sample material support cases (n = 113) 
compared to AQAM (n = 64). The variation in the number of material support cases between the 
two is likely the result of shifts in counterterrorism policies over time and will be further 
examined in figure 1. The number of indictees and the number of counts for material support 
court cases are also provided in table 1 and will be further analyzed by subcategory in the results 
chapter. 
 While examining the basic court case descriptives for material support cases is helpful in 
understanding the charge within court cases, the primary unit of analysis for this study is 
terrorism incidents. To be more specific, for this study terrorism incidents are post-9/11 violent 
                                                
5 Indictee gender only included indictees who had been fully coded. For example, out of 503 
“other Islamic Extremist” post-9/11 indictees, only 317 had a coded gender. 
6 AQAM or “Al Qaeda and Affiliated Movement.” 
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plots or incidents linked to Islamic Extremist groups7/ideologies, which in turn are linked to at 
least one federal court case. For this project, I included 83 post-9/11 Islamic Extremist-linked 
domestic or international incidents that were linked to at least one federal court case that 
contained one or more material support charge(s). Violent terrorism incidents were qualified as 
having at least one actionable step taken towards planning or preparing to carrying out the 
incident and meeting the FBI's definition of terrorism. After this, 57 post-9/11 terrorism incidents 
or plots linked to international Islamic Extremist FTOs between October 2001 and January 2017 
were added as a comparison group, for a total of 140 incidents. Since material support of 
terrorism is an international8 charge, cases labeled as “domestic” under the U.S. Attorney 
General’s Guidelines were excluded. This eliminated court cases and incidents where no link to a 
FTO-labeled Islamic Extremist group could be made. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
7 This refers to extremists who adhere to aspects of the following beliefs or ideals: 1) only 
Islam promotes human dignity and affirms God’s authority; 2) rejection of the traditional 
Muslim respect for “People of the Book,” (i.e., Christians and Jews); 3) believe that “Jihad” (i.e., 
to struggle in the God’s path like the Prophet Muhammad) is a defining belief in Islam and 
includes the “lesser Jihad” that endorses violence against “corrupt” others. 4) The belief that 
their faith is oppressed by governments in the Middle East, North Africa, and Asia that they view 
as corrupt and occupying Islamic lands (e.g., Russia/Chechnya). 5) Belief that the United States 
is supporting the humiliation of Islam and exploiting the region’s resources while also engaging 
in a hedonistic culture (e.g., gay-rights, feminism, sexual permissiveness, alcohol abuse, racism, 
etc.) and view it as negatively affecting Muslim values. 6) The belief that the American people 
are responsible for their government’s actions and that there is a religious obligation to combat 
this perceived assault. 7) The belief that Islamic law—Sharia—provides the blueprint for a 
modern Muslim society and should be forcibly implemented. 
8 Refer to Appendix A for breakdown on the difference between Domestic and International 
terrorism according to the FBI. 
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Table 2: Characteristics of the Terrorism Incidents in the Sample 
 N %   
Incident-link     
Material Support  83 59.3%   
Non-Material Support 57 40.7%   
Total 140 100.0   
Group-Link 
AQAM 87 62.1% 
  
ISIS 53 37.9%   
Total 140 100.0   
 
Incident Outcome   
  
Success/Partial Success 30 21.4%   
Unsuccessful 110 78.6%   
Total 140 100.0   
 
Human Intelligence Yes No 
  
Material Support 49 34   
Non-Material Support 17 40   
Total 66 74   
 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the incident data used within the current study. 
The final data sample included 140 post-9/11violent plots or incidents9. For the purpose of this 
study, successful and partially successful incident categories were collapsed to create a 
dichotomous measure of successful or partially successful compared to incidents that were 
unsuccessful. Incidents were deemed unsuccessful if they failed or were foiled as a result of 
human intervention, plot cancelation, or weapon failure. The final data included 30 
successful/partial successful incidents and 110 unsuccessful or foiled incidents. After separating 
Islamic Extremist-linked incidents subcategories, 87 of the examined incidents were primarily 
linked to AQAM, with the remaining 53 being linked to ISIS. Finally, the use of human 
                                                
9 Both international and domestic incidents were included in the sample as long as they were 
linked an individual indicted in U.S. federal court under one of the material support statutes. 
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intelligence during terrorism investigations was examined among material support (49) and other 
(17) Islamic Extremist-linked incidents. 
Variable Descriptions 
 In order to better understand how material support cases and defendants charged with 
material support differ from other terrorism court case indictees, basic descriptive statistics on 
indictee and court case variables were conducted. The first descriptive variable, indictment date, 
looks at trends in post-9/11 indictment dates10 for individuals with at least one material support 
charge and all other Islamic Extremist-linked indictees. Next, court case outcomes for indictees 
were examined. Case outcome captures whether an indictee charged with at least one material 
support of terrorism charge (0) is a fugitive, (1) pleaded guilty, received a (2) trial conviction, is 
currently (3) awaiting trial, was (4) acquitted, had his/her case (5) dismissed, or (6) died prior to 
trial.  
 After performing descriptive analyses on indictees, AQAM and ISIS-linked court cases 
were analyzed. The use of human intelligence in AQAM and ISIS cases was dichotomously 
coded as (0) no human intelligence used and (1) yes human intelligence used. Second, the 
average number of indictees and the average number of charges (including material support 
charges) between AQAM and ISIS was analyzed.  
 Since the primary dependent variable for this study is incident successfulness, measured 
as (0) unsuccessful and (1) successful/partially successful, ATS incident-level variables were 
used to capture various incident characteristics. To answer the hypothesis associated with my 
first research question, incidents were coded as (1) material support and (0) not material support 
in order to establish whether an individual indicted for material support of terrorism was linked 
                                                
10 Indictment date is calculated as the date of the first federal indictment for an individual. 
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to an incident. In an effort to measure the impact that human intelligence efforts may have on 
incidents, incidents were once again coded dichotomously as having (1) or not having (0) a 
human intelligence operative involved in the pre-incident investigation or planning process.11 
 After labeling material support and human intelligence-linked cases, weapon 
sophistication was measured and coded for each incident or plot. Similar to Gruenewald et. al. 
(2016), the type of intended or actual weapon(s) for an incident was coded on a five-point 
sophistication scale from 1-5 before being recoded into a three-point lykert-type variable used by 
Smith (2016). The level of sophistication for a particular type of weapon was based on how 
difficult it is to obtain and successfully deploy the weapon(s)12, defined as (3) most sophisticated, 
(2) moderately sophisticated, and (1) least sophisticated. These three categories included the 
following types of weapon(s): (1) blunt objects, hands/feet/fists, knives or other sharp objects, 
etc., (2) arson/fire, simple incendiary devices, and firearms (3) IEDs, other explosive types, 
RPGs, projectile weapons, chemical weapons, and airplanes (Gruenewald et al., 2016; Smith, 
2016). Next, the number of participants13 involved in incidents were categorized into (1) single 
participant, (2) two or three participants, and (4) four or more participants.14 Finally, the 
planned or actual target/victim type was coded as (1) citizens, (2) business/commercial, (3) 
political/government, (4) military, (5) law enforcement, (6) transportation, (7) social minority, or 
(8) other (Gruenewald et al., 2016). 
                                                
11 Individuals are linked to an incident and involved as a co-conspirator in any part of the 
planning, preparation, or action stages of an incident. For confidential informants and UCAs this 
would include providing resources, contacts, information, or any other form of assistance. 
12 Incidents involving more than one weapon type were coded for the most sophisticated 
weapon type, even if it was not the primary weapon. 
13 Refer to footnote 11 
14 The number of participants includes any government informants/agents in applicable cases. 
Is coded from the perspective of the indicted individuals 
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Analytic Strategy 
 The analysis will be presented in a series of stages. I began by looking at a timeline of 
material support and non-material support indictments over the years before providing 
descriptive demographic and outcome statistics about those indicted under material support. This 
timeline is followed by a cross tabulations comparison between AQAM and ISIS material 
support court cases. The third stage examines the successfulness of material support and non-
material support-linked incidents while also investigating the use of human intelligence and 
incident success. In the final stage, I examined the influence of material support charges on the 
potential or actual scale of an incident. 
 A logistical regression was conducted to confirm findings from the cross tabulation 
results and determine the odds ratio for material support and incident success as well as 
answering my first hypothesis. After answering my first hypothesis, linear regression modeling 
was applied to study the influence material support charges and other factors have on potential or 
actual scale for violent plots or incidents. In an attempt to construct a dependent measurement of 
scale, factor analysis scores for weapon sophistication and number of participants were scored as 
a regression through combined principal component analysis, creating a 0-3 measurement of 
scale. After examining how material support charges and other factors impact the combined 
influence of weapon sophistication and number of participants, they were separated and 
independently measured using linear regression. Material support, human intelligence, and target 
type were used as controls for all linear regression models. The type of potential/actual target for 
each incident were used as additional controls, with citizen targets serving as the reference 
category. The following section will outline my findings. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS 
 
Since the 9/11 attacks there has been a spike in the number of terrorism-related 
investigations and indictments. Material support charges, while prevalent following the 9/11 
attacks, were not used in a majority of cases until after 2009 (Center on Law and Security, 2011). 
 
Figure 1: Islamic Extremist Individual Indictments (2000-2016) 
 
As shown in figure 1, there was a noticeable increase in the number of terrorism-related 
indictments following the 9/11 attacks. One could assume that this is a result of the shift in the 
U.S. government’s focus on counterterrorism policy, specifically towards Islamic Extremist-
inspired terrorism. Between 2008 and 2010, there was a strong increase in the number of 
material support indictments compared to indictments prior to 2008. This, again, may be 
explained by the establishment of Al-Shabaab as a FTO in 2008 and a change in 
counterterrorism policy following the election of President Obama in 2008. The establishment of 
FTO’s like ISIS in 2014 also corresponds with an increase in material support indictments. 
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Significance Tests – Demographics and Outcomes 
 
Cross tabulations were run to compare case outcomes between material support and non-
material support indictees. Crosstabs were also used to compare AQAM and ISIS indictees and 
court cases on counts number and number of indictees.  
Table 3 Indictee Court Case Outcomes 
Outcome Mat. Support Islamic Extremist Total 
 
Acquittal/Dismissed 
 
17 
4.2% 
 
20 
6.6% 
 
37 
5.2% 
 
Awaiting Trial 
 
44 
10.8% 
 
27 
8.9% 
 
71 
10.0% 
 
Fugitive/Died Prior to Trial 
 
39  
9.6% 
 
20 
6.6% 
 
59 
8.3% 
 
Extradited/Transferred/ 
Unknown 
 
9 
2.2% 
 
7  
2.3% 
 
16 
2.3% 
 
Plead Guilty 
 
220  
54.1% 
 
176  
57.9% 
 
396  
55.7% 
 
Trial Conviction 
 
78  
19.2% 
 
54  
17.8% 
 
132  
18.6% 
 
Total 
 
N= 407 
 
N= 304 
 
N= 711 
(x2 = 5.121    df = 5   p = NS) *includes cases where Indictee outcome were sealed 
 
According to table 3, no significant difference exists between material support indictees and 
other Islamic Extremist-linked indictees. Varying sample sizes may factor into some of the 
variation between categories such as fugitives/died before trial and those awaiting trial. This may 
be a result of material support charges being charged to individuals who have successfully 
traveled overseas to join and fight with Islamic Extremist groups. An example of this is a group 
of six Yemeni-American friends who lived in New York, often referred to as the Lackawanna 
six, who were all convicted of providing material support to Al-Qaeda in December 2003 after 
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attending an Al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan in the Spring of 2001 (United States v. 
Goba, 2002). While Parrot et al. (2008) found that supporters of terrorism were significantly 
more likely to enter guilty pleas than all other terrorists; Table 3 shows no significant differences 
between supporter and non-supporters when confined to Islamic Extremists. Thus, the difference 
is likely a categorical difference (Islamic Extremist versus Far-right, etc.) rather than a difference 
among Islamic Extremist subcategories. 
Court Cases 
 
As mentioned earlier, while the category of Islamic Extremist terrorism shares common 
differences when compared to other categories of terrorism, one should be careful when grouping 
all types of Islamic Extremist terrorists together. AQAM and ISIS subcategories of Islamic 
Extremism were examined separately to determine if any patterns of behavior differed between 
the two. 
 Referring back to table 2, material support charges have been used more often (64%) in 
ISIS-linked court cases than AQAM-linked court cases (56%). This difference is likely explained 
by the increase in material support charge usage observed in figure 1 along with shifts in 
counterterrorism policy. Within material support court cases, questions remain regarding potential 
differences between traditional AQAM-linked cases and more recent ISIS-linked cases.  
Table 5 Crosstab of Total Number of All Counts in Court Cases 
Subcategory 1 Count 2-3 Counts 3-4 Counts > 4 Counts Total 
 
AQAM 
 
13 
11.5% 
 
37 
32.7% 
 
24 
21.2% 
 
39 
34.5% 
 
113 
100% 
 
ISIS 
 
26 
40.6% 
 
19 
29.7% 
 
12 
18.8% 
 
7 
10.9% 
 
64 
100% 
Total  39 
22.0% 
56 
31.6% 
36 
20.3% 
46 
26.0% 
N= 177 
100% 
(x2 = 24.71    df = 3   p  ≤ .001) 
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 Table 5 looks at the overall number of counts (including material support charges) in 
AQAM-linked and ISIS-linked material support court cases. According to the table, AQAM-
linked cases are significantly more likely to have four or more counts (35%) than ISIS-linked 
cases (11%), while ISIS-linked cases are more likely to have only one count (41%) compared to 
AQAM-linked cases (12%). This discrepancy raises the question as to why there are such 
significant differences between the two types of court cases?  One way to look into this further is 
to compare the number of indictees in each court case.  This is important, as the number of 
indictees in a court case could be the reason for more overall counts due to added complexity and 
offenses within a single case.  
Table 6 Crosstab of Total Number of Indictees in Court Cases 
Subcategory 1 Indictee 2-3 Indictees > 4 Indictees Total 
 
AQAM 
 
57 
50.4% 
 
32 
28.3% 
 
24 
21.2% 
 
113 
100% 
 
ISIS 
 
52 
81.3% 
 
8 
12.5% 
 
4 
6.3% 
 
64 
100% 
 
Total  109 
61.6% 
40 
22.6% 
28 
15.8% 
N= 177 
100% 
(x2 = 16.62    df = 2   p = .000) 
 
 Table 6 attempts to answer this by looking at the overall number of indictees15 in these 
court cases. Once again, there is a significant difference between AQAM-linked and ISIS-linked 
court cases when it comes to number of indictees. ISIS-linked cases are significantly more likely 
to have only one Indictee (81%) than are AQAM-linked court cases (50%), while AQAM-linked 
cases are more likely to have four or more indictees (21%) than are ISIS-linked cases (6%). This 
                                                
15 Number of indictees includes those charged with material support charges and those not, as 
long as at least one indictee is charged with material support. 
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also confirms that ISIS-linked cases not only have fewer counts, but also have less indictees than 
AQAM-linked cases. The following section will look at material support charges and how they 
relate to incident outcomes and potential scale. 
Material Support and Incidents 
In order to begin to understand the potential link between material support and incident 
success, a simple cross tabulation was run comparing material support-linked incidents and non-
material support-linked incidents and incident outcome.   
Table 7 Crosstab of Incident Outcomes 
Incident Outcome Islamic Extremist Material Support Total 
 
Unsuccessful 
 
36 
63.2% 
 
74 
89.2% 
 
110 
78.6% 
 
Successful 
 
21 
36.8% 
 
9 
10.8% 
 
30 
21.4% 
 
Total  57 
100% 
83 
100% 
N= 140 
100% 
(x2 = 13.57    df = 1   p = .000) 
 
Table 7 reveals that of the 158 analyzed incidents, only 13% of the material support-linked 
incidents or plots were successful, while 39% of the non-material support-linked incidents or 
plots were successful. In order to better understand the potential relationship between these 
variables descriptive statistics were run. The following tables will further analyze the 
relationship between material support cases and incident outcomes as they relate to the use of 
human intelligence sources. 
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Table 9 Descriptives of Incident Outcomes and Informants 
Human Intelligence Unsuccessful 
Incident 
Successful 
Incident 
Total 
 
No 
 
44 
59.5% 
 
30 
40.5% 
 
74 
100% 
 
Yes 
 
66 
100% 
 
0 
0.0% 
 
66 
100% 
 
Total  110 
78.6% 
30 
21.4% 
N= 140 
100% 
* Chi-square analysis could not be conducted due to successful incidents linked to human 
intelligence value being less than 5. 
 
Table 9 shows that among incidents without human intelligence there is a fairly similar 
spread between unsuccessful (60%) and successful incidents (41%). The most important finding 
revealed in this table is the overwhelming 100% relationship between the use of human 
intelligence and incidents being unsuccessful. Since the use of human intelligence is such a 
strong predictor of incident success, one would expect the presence of human intelligence in 
material support cases to have a similar impact. 
Table 10 Crosstab of Material Support Cases and Informants 
Human Intelligence Non-Material 
Support 
Material 
Support 
Total 
 
No 
 
40 
70.2% 
 
34 
41.0% 
 
74 
52.9% 
 
Yes 
 
17 
29.8% 
 
49 
59.0% 
 
66 
47.1% 
 
Total 57 
100% 
83 
100% 
N= 140 
100% 
(x2 = 11.57    df = 1   p  ≤ .001) 
 
 Table 10 presents the number of material support and non-material support cases that are 
linked to the usage of human intelligence. Interestingly, 59% of material support-linked incidents 
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involved human intelligence compared to non-material support incidents (30%). While it has 
been established in tables 7 through 10 that material support and the presence of human 
intelligence are related to and influence incident success, it is not known how much material 
support influences incident success. To help answer this, a logistical regression model was 
conducted looking at incident success (DV) and explanatory variables (IVs) such as material 
support, informants, weapon sophistication, and number of participants. 
Table 11 Logistical Regression on Incident Success 
Model B SE 𝑾𝒂𝒍𝒅 𝑬𝒙𝒑(𝑩) 
(Constant) 1.073 .565 3.606 2.925 
Material Support -1.548** .542 8.162 .213 
Weapon Sophistication -1.055** .334 9.952 .348 
Number Participants -.149 .380 .154 .862 
      DV: Incident Success 
 
The findings in table 11 show that, net of all other variables, material support significantly 
decreases the likelihood of incident success. Specifically, material support charges and weapon 
sophistication have a 79% and 65% odds ratio, respectfully. These findings fail to support my 
first hypothesis that material support-linked violent plots are more likely to be successful than 
non-material support-linked violent plots. Table 11 also alludes to an interesting influence 
human intelligence has on incident success. 
Material Support and Scale 
 If material support and the presence of human intelligence influence the likelihood of an 
incident to be successful, another question is whether incidents involving material support 
charges or human intelligence are greater in scale than other incidents. This is an important 
question as not all incidents are successful and able to be analyzed using traditional 
measurements of scale (fatalities, damages, etc.). While weapon sophistication and number of 
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participants are not complete measurements of scale, they do cover different dimensions of the 
potential or actual scale of an incident and influence the likelihood of success for an incident 
(Smith, 2016). Along with looking at what impacts weapon sophistication and the number of 
participants for an incident, additional controls such as the type of potential/actual target for each 
incident were accounted for (citizen targets served as a reference). In order to capture the 
potential scale of weapon sophistication and number of participants, the factor analysis scores 
from both variables were scored as a regression through combined principal component analysis. 
While the combined regression factor score of these two variables is not meaningful as a unit by 
itself, it does paint a picture of scale for potential or completed incidents. 
Table 12 Linear Regression on Regression Scale (N= 140) 
Model B SE B 𝜷 
(Constant) -493. .162 --- 
Material Support .602** .163 .297 
Human Intelligence .320* .160 .160 
Target Business .645* .272 .194 
Target Government .174 .236 .062 
Target Military -.276 .200 -.121 
Target Law Enforcement -1.025* .421 -.191 
Target Transportation -.081 .260 .093 
Target Other .782 .647 .093 
  DV: Regression factor score for weapon sophistication and number of participants 
 
Table 12 presents the amount of influence each of these factors have on measurements of 
scale. The table reveals a strong positive relationship between material support and human 
intelligence on increases in the combined influence of weapons sophistication and number of 
participants, as seen through the increase in the factor component score. Compared to plots 
targeting citizens, incidents targeting law enforcement and businesses are marginally significant; 
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with plots against law enforcement targets being much less sophisticated than the rest. While 
table 12 seems to support my second hypothesis that material support-linked violent plots will 
have a larger potential scale than non-material support-linked violent plots, it does not tell the 
entire story and should be examined further. 
In fact, breaking apart the combined effect of weapon sophistication and number of 
participants and independently analyzing them tells a different story. When it comes to weapon 
sophistication, material support no longer has a significant relationship (.248) and number of 
participants becomes the most significant predictor of weapon sophistication (.001). 
Table 13 Linear Regression on Weapon Sophistication (N= 140) 
Model B SE B 𝜷 
(Constant) 1.360 .106 --- 
Material Support -.172 .118 -.131 
Human Intelligence .169 .102 .130 
Number Participants .218** .074 .268 
Target Business .360 .175 .168 
Target Government .179 .151 .099 
Target Military -.137 .128 -.093 
Target Law Enforcement -.865** .269 -.249 
Target Transportation .630** .174 .310 
Target Other .400 .414 .074 
DV: Weapon Sophistication 
 
Table 13, similar to table 12, reveals a significant decrease in weapons sophistication when law 
enforcement is targeted. The large discrepancy in material support’s influence between table 12 
and 13 raises questions regarding the relationship material support has with the number of 
participants in an incident or plot. It turns out that material support has a very strong and 
significant relationship to the number of participants. 
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Table 14 Linear Regression on Number of Participants (N= 140) 
Model B SE B 𝜷 
(Constant) -.111 .183 --- 
Material Support .754** .120 .468 
Human Intelligence -.091 .119 -.057 
Weapon Sophistication .288** .098 .235 
Target Business .157 .204 .060 
Target Government -.056 .174 -.025 
Target Military -.088 .147 -.049 
Target Law Enforcement .098 .321 .023 
Target Transportation -.826** .196 -.332 
Target Other .236 .477 .035 
 DV: Number of Participants 
 
Table 14 supports this claim, revealing that material support and weapons sophistication have 
strong positive relationships with the number of participants. Transportation targets are also 
significantly related to the number of participants; with fewer participants being involved in plots 
or attacks against transportation targets. 
 In summary, while material support does lead to increased scale in the combined 
influence of weapons sophistication and the number of participants, tables 13 and 14 reveal that 
that it is not material support that increases the scale of potential incidents or plots, but rather the 
number of participants.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS 
This study examines the relationship material support of terrorism charges have with 
incident success and scale. The analysis also examines the difference between material support 
and non-material support cases, including differences between AQAM and ISIS-linked court 
cases. The analysis revealed that there are significant differences between material support and 
non-material support-linked incidents as well as differences between AQAM and ISIS-linked 
material support cases. In this chapter, I will present an argument on potential reasons why 
material support cases have the relationship they do with incident outcomes and scale, and 
discuss how the government has used the charge to secure convictions in terrorism-related court 
cases.  
Before testing my first research question, I compared material support of terrorism 
indictments against other Islamic Extremist-linked terrorism indictments. The results provided in 
figure 1 show a sharp increase in the number of terrorism-related indictments in the aftermath of 
the 9/11 attacks. As previously mentioned, this increase in terrorism-related indictments may be 
explained by the U.S. Government's shift in focus to targeting other potential Islamic Extremist-
linked terrorists as well as the introduction of new counterterrorism policies. Figure 1 also 
illustrated how shifts in counterterrorism policy, presidential elections, and the rise and fall of 
terrorist groups can influence the frequency of terrorism-related indictments and charges.  
Along with comparing material support indictments to other Islamic Extremist-linked 
indictments, case outcome differences between material support and non-material support-linked 
court cases were examined. While it was anticipated that there would be significant differences 
between material and non-material support-linked cases, supporting the findings of Parrott et al. 
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(2008), there were no significant differences between the two. This is likely due to the current 
study only examining post 9/11 Islamic Extremist-linked court cases. 
Next, when looking solely at material support-linked court cases, a significant difference 
emerges between AQAM and ISIS-linked cases, particularly in the total number of indictees and 
counts. The majority of ISIS-linked court cases (81%) contained only one defendant, whereas 
AQAM-linked cases involved one defendant only 50% of the time. On the contrary, AQAM-
linked cases were more likely to have four or more defendants (21%) compared to ISIS-linked 
cases (6%). This trend continues for the total number of counts within court cases, as ISIS-linked 
cases are more likely to have only one charge (41%) compared to AQAM-linked cases (12%). 
One explanation for this may lie in the high number of ISIS-linked cases involving one person 
attempting to travel overseas and join the terrorist organization. This observation stems from 
anecdotal evidence encountered while coding ISIS-linked court cases. With ISIS being a hot 
political topic and focus of government investigations, prosecutors have found success in 
convicting individuals on fewer counts compared to earlier AQAM-linked cases, where 
prosecutors set out to indict as many persons in a single court case with as many counts as 
possible. Another explanation for this could lie in the complexity of ISIS-linked court cases. 
What I mean by this, is that increased implementation of human intelligence in more recent 
terrorism-related investigations has allowed prosecutors to gather evidence quicker and charge 
individuals earlier in an investigation (McNulty, 2006). Material support of terrorism charges 
have also been used extensively in many of these cases in an effort to exert pressure toward a 
plea bargain (Setty, 2015) 
According to a report by the former Deputy U.S. Attorney General Paul J. McNulty in 
2006, one of the biggest challenges facing law enforcement in the fight against terrorism is 
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staying a step ahead of the ever-growing sophistication of terrorist organization, especially in 
their utilization of the Internet for recruitment and global communication. Because of this,  
“[law enforcement] is regularly confronted with the challenging task of having to identify 
[terrorism] risks and prosecute early enough to prevent harm to America, while 
simultaneously having to let our investigations play out long enough to allow [law 
enforcement] to identify all co-conspirators in a terrorist plot and to accumulate evidence 
sufficient to prosecute” (McNulty, 2006). 
 
This quotation supports what has been observed the current study, that the use of human 
intelligence and material support charges have been on the rise and a successful strategy in the 
investigation and prosecution of individuals charged in terrorism-related court cases. 
To examine the first research question, a series of statistical tests were run looking at 
material support-linked incidents compared to non-material support-linked incidents as well as 
the use of confidential informants or UCAs in material support-linked cases. Material support-
linked incident success (11%) was significantly low compared to other Islamic Extremist-linked 
non-material support incidents (37%). With nearly 90% of material support-linked incidents 
resulting in failure, descriptive statistics were run looking at whether the use of human 
intelligence influenced incident success. This finding revealed a startling and important finding; 
when human intelligence is involved in a terrorist plot, incidents are unsuccessful 100% of the 
time. The best explanation for this potentially lies in the role confidential informants and UCAs 
play in terrorism-related investigations. As Gruenewald et al., (2016) pointed out, while these 
foiled plots are often viewed as victories by government officials, questions regarding the 
investigative techniques used by confidential informants or UCAs have raised concerns. For 
example, if confidential informants or UCAs are the original masterminds behind a planned plot 
or are providing critical components for an incident, the incident will always be foiled since the 
government has “control” of the plot as they build prosecutorial evidence for court. This results 
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in a potential select effect limitation. Differentiating and analyzing the exact type and role human 
intelligence play in individual investigations or plots was not available in this current study and 
was a limiting factor in being able to further deconstruct their exact role in terrorism-related 
investigations.  
I next looked at how often human intelligence was utilized in material support-linked 
incidents and non-material support-linked incidents. Not surprisingly, human intelligence was 
present in 60% of material support-linked incidents compared to only 30% of other Islamic 
Extremist-linked incidents. Again, this is likely a result of the role human intelligence plays in 
terrorism-related investigations. “Apart from assessing and identifying potential terrorists and 
potential co-conspirators, confidential informants and UCAs are also responsible for 
accumulating sufficient evidence that is able to satisfy the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard 
in court” (McNulty, 2006). Based on informant gathered from human intelligence sources, the 
government has been able to successfully prosecute individuals with material support of 
terrorism due to its vague language and broad reach (Gruenewald et al., 2016). As previously 
discussed, even if the indicted person did not have a strong desire to commit an act of terrorism 
on their own, the fact that they spoke favorably of committing an attack or provided tangible 
material support to a confidential informant or UCA is often enough evidence to secure a 
material support of terrorism conviction.  
This significant relationship between the use of human intelligence and material support-
linked incidents and unsuccessful incidents appears to contradict my first hypotheses that 
material support-linked incidents will have a higher rate of success than non-material support-
linked incidents. To confirm this finding, a logistical regression analysis looking at material 
support and incident success was run, confirming that material support has a significant negative 
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relationship with incident success. The majority of material support-linked incidents involving 
the use of human intelligence, again, may explain this result.  Material support charges were not 
the only variable significantly related to a decrease in the likelihood an incident was successful; 
incidents with greater weapon sophistication were associated with incident failure, rather than 
success. Reasons for this could be due to increased difficulty in obtaining and utilizing more 
sophisticated weapons without being detected by law enforcement or resulting in weapon failure 
(Smith et. al., 2016). Again, the presence of confidential informants or UCAs, while relevant to 
this study, results in a potential selection effect, as informants building evidence for court 
prosecutions may affect increases in weapon sophistication. I anecdotally observed incidents 
where human intelligence sources provided weapons or encouraged the use of more sophisticated 
weapons during the planning process. 
Regarding testing my second hypothesis concerning incident scale, material support 
charges were found to have a significant and positive influence on the scale of incidents, or at 
least the combined weight of weapon sophistication and the number of participants. Material 
support increasing the likelihood of greater incident scale appears to be explained in table 14 by 
increasing the number of participants. It is also important – when comparing with the results of 
table 6 – to recognize that participants includes indicted and unindicted co-conspirators, meaning 
that even though a plot may involve multiple individuals, it does not mean they will all be 
indicted. 
Surprisingly, only the number of participants increased weapon sophistication. Similar to 
Smith et. al. (2016), the number of offenders involved in a terrorist incident was significantly 
related to an increase in weapon sophistication. One possible explanation for this is that when 
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more persons are engaged in a plot, there is an increase in opportunities and determination to 
incorporate complicated, and lethal, large-scale weapons (Smith, 2016). 
As previously mentioned, potential or actual target types were implemented as controls 
within my linear models. One reoccurring limitation in this study is the ability to use other 
traditional incident control variables such as planning cycle, the number of preparatory activities, 
deaths, injuries, damages, etc. These variables were not available for all analyzed incidents, as 
many of the incidents never came to fruition, had not been coded in their entirety, or were 
currently being investigated/prosecuted.  
Table 12 revealed that, compared to incidents targeting citizens, incidents targeting 
businesses significantly increase the scale of an incident – or at least the combined effect of 
weapon sophistication and the number of participants. Also, compared to citizen targets, 
incidents targeting law enforcement were significantly related to decreases in weapon 
sophistication. The decreased weapon sophistication associated with law enforcement targets 
may be explained by some anecdotal evidence in which perpetrators targeted law enforcement 
individuals or entities as reactionary crimes occurring before or during apprehension or 
interaction. One example of this was Fareed Mumuni who, knowing law enforcement was onto 
his plot, lunged at officers with a knife while they were carrying out an arrest warrant at his 
residence. During the trial, it was discovered that Mumuni had stored additional knives in 
various locations in the event law enforcement attempted to arrest him before the completion of 
his plot (United States v. Saleh et al., 2017). Another example of law enforcement being targeted 
with less sophisticated weapons is Usaamah Rahim, who was plotting with others to behead an 
unidentified U.S. citizen before deciding to target to law enforcement due to a co-conspirators 
belief that they were being watched and because he believed law enforcement was "the easiest 
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target." Shortly afterward, Rahim would be confronted by law enforcement officers in a Boston 
parking lot, where he would be shot and killed upon charging at them. (United States v. Wright et 
al., 2015). Interestingly, the presence of human intelligence within both Mumuni and Rahim’s 
cases was minimal, with each of them only being surveilled by law enforcement.  
This raises an important question concerning the role human intelligence plays in 
incidents and how they often push for larger targets and more sophisticated weapons.  As seen in 
table 12, the results indicated a positive, significant relationship between the existence of human 
intelligence and increases in overall scale. An example of human intelligence sources 
purposefully increasing the scale, especially weapon sophistication is the case of Hemant 
Lakhani. During the course of the investigation the government informant proposed that Lakhani 
obtain a shoulder-mounted missile launcher and then sell it to the informant. When Lakhani was 
unable to obtain a missile, the government arranged for an undercover agent to "sell" him a 
missile, so that Lakhani could turn around and sell it to the informant (Bartosiewicz, 2005). 
Another example is Hosam Smadi, a nineteen-year-old, who the FBI identified online and 
introduced to an UCA. The UCA supplied Smadi with a fake car bomb, instructing him to 
detonate it under a prominent Dallas skyscraper (Norris and Grol-Prokopczyk, 2017). Or 
perhaps, the most startling case, United States v. Pimentel (1994), where Jose Pimental was 
convicted of constructing a pipe bomb with the intent of using it during a terrorist attack. The 
problem? Pimentel was mentally ill and required precise instructions for each step in 
manufacturing the pipe bomb, requiring the NYPD informant's assistance in drilling holes in the 
pipe as well as purchasing the necessary ingredients (Rashbaum & Goldstein, 2011). 
Contrary to law enforcement targets, incidents aimed at targeting transportation targets 
were significantly more likely to increase weapon sophistication and decrease the number of 
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participants. An explanation for this would be the rise in the number of terrorist plots targeting 
large metropolitan subway or train systems. Cases like Shahawar Siraj and James Elshafay’s 
attempt to bomb the New York subway system before the 2004 Republican National Convention, 
Assem Hammoud’s attempt to bomb the New York and New Jersey subway systems, Abdul 
Kadir and his accomplices plot to bomb the fuel line at JFK International Airport, and Farooque 
Ahmed’s attempt to bomb Washington D.C.-area subway stations are just a few examples of 
plots targeting the transportation sector. Not surprisingly, many of these plots involve the 
implementation of more sophisticated weapons such as cookers and other explosive devices to 
inflict the maximum number of casualties and cripple the transportation sector and those who use 
its services.  
Additional Limitations 
Along with the limitation as mentioned earlier, the overarching limitation for this study 
boils down to a selection effect. Since this study operationalizes an incident or court cases as 
being linked to material support if there is at least one material support of terrorism statute 
present, there is a selection effect in the final sample. For example, there are incidents where 
explicit and overt material support actions may have occurred, but it would not be linked to 
material support unless materials support of terrorism count was present. The dependency on 
material support charges being present means that only incidents and court cases with federal 
indictments are in the final material support-linked sample. This dependence relies on the 
government's decision on whether to indict an individual with material support of terrorism 
charges, making it a policy and prosecutorial decision limitation. These limitations will be 
addressed again, along with suggestions for future research, in the following section. 
  
 37 
CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
Previous literature, while establishing a foundation for this current study, has been 
focused more towards case study and policy examinations, demographics and descriptive 
analysis with little empirical research. The present study adds to previous literature by taking an 
empirical approach to the material support of terrorism charges and their relationship with 
planned or completed terrorist plots. This study confirms previous findings and reveals a 
significant relationship between material support charges and incident success and scale. These 
results illustrate the impact material support charges can have on the scale and success of 
incidents as well as the high correlation the charge has with the use of confidential informants 
and undercover agents. The current study confirms that material support charges have a 
significant influence on the outcome and scale of Islamic Extremist-linked incidents, while also 
setting a foundation for future research.  
While this study analyzed court case outcomes for indictees, future research should 
investigate how various material support statutes differ in terms of sentencing and punishment. 
This future research could be accomplished by examining the how often particular material 
support statutes result in guilty pleas, trial convictions, acquittals, etc. as well as the types of 
sentences or punishments handed down compared to other charges in terrorism-related court 
cases. This analysis would provide a better understanding of the effectiveness of material support 
of terrorism charge usage.  
Along with this, future research should delve into specific language and tactics utilized in 
material support of terrorism court cases to better understand how the prosecution and defense 
handle material support charges. This could be accomplished by examining the amount and type 
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of motions, evidence, superseding indictments, and prosecutorial and defenses methods used 
within material support cases compared to other terrorism-related cases. 
Future research should also examine the use of material support charges across a wider 
timeframe and multiple categories of terrorism, not just Islamic Extremist-linked cases. This 
widened scope would provide a better understanding of material support charges usage before 
9/11 as well as their implementation in non-Islamic Extremist-linked cases like narco-terrorism 
cases.  
 Finally, though it is known that the presence of human intelligence sources greatly 
increases the likelihood for incident failure and obtaining convictions in terrorism-related court 
cases, but there is still debate surrounding how they are used in these investigations. While some 
offenders have or likely would have engaged in terrorist acts or plots without the introduction of 
human intelligence sources, there remain cases where planned terrorist plots would not have 
existed without them (Bernstein, 2013; Norris and Grol-Prokopzyk, 2017). Thus, an important 
question for future research to answer is whether the use of human intelligence sources is 
justified and how the use of confidential informants differs from the use of undercover agents. 
The current study has built upon previous literature and set a foundation for future 
research examining material support of terrorism cases and incidents. While not able to answer 
all questions surrounding material support cases, this study sheds further light on some of the 
controversies and complexities surrounding material support of terrorism charges and their usage 
in terrorism-related cases within the United States. 
  
 39 
REFERENCES 
 
Aaronson, T. (2011, September/October). The Informants. Retrieved from 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/08/fbi-terrorist-informants  
 
Aaronson, T. (2013). The Terror Factory: Inside the FBI's Manufactured War on Terrorism. 
Brooklyn, NY: Ig Publishing. 
 
Abrams, N. (2010). The Material Support Terrorism Offenses: Perspectives Derived from the 
(Early) Model Penal Code, 1 Journal of National Security, Law, and Policy. 5, 5–6 
(2010). http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/02_ABRAMS_MASTER.pdf 
 
Bartosiewicz, P. (2005). I.O.U. One Terrorist: Rounding Up “Al Qaeda, ”. OneStoogeata Time, 
Harpers Magazine, Aug. 1, 2005, at 48, 48.  
 
Bernstein, Richard (2010). A Defense That Could Be Obsolete, International Herald Tribune. 
Dec. 1, 2010, p. 2. 
 
Bernstein, A. (2013). The Hidden Costs of Terrorist Watch Lists. 61 Buffilo Law Review. 461, 
478. 
 
Center on National Security at Fordham Law. (2016). ISIS Cases in the United States, 
http://static1.squarespace.com/static/55dc76f7e4b013c872183fea/t/56be4881b654f9af652
ea926/1 455310977496/ISIS+Statistical+Overview+%26+Names+02-12-16.pdf.  
 
Cole, D. (2003). The new McCarthyism: Repeating history in the war on terrorism. Harv. CR-
CLL Rev., 38, 1. 
 
Dahl, J. E. (2011). “The Plots that Failed: Intelligence Lessons Learned from Unsuccessful 
Terrorist Attacks Against the United States,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34 (2011): 
621–48. 
 
Department of Justice. (2005) The USA PATRIOT Act: Preserving Life and Liberty. Retrieved 
from https://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm  
 
Department of Justice. (2002). “Fact Sheet: Shifting from Prosecution to Prevention, 
Redesigning the Justice Department to Prevent Future Acts of Terrorism,” 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2002/fbireorganizationfactsheet.htm 
 
DeRosa, M. (2005). Material Support. Retrieved from 
https://apps.americanbar.org/natsecurity/patriotdebates/material-support  
 
Doyle, C. (2010). Terrorist material support an overview of 18 U.S.C. 2339A and 2339B (pp. 1-
33) (United States, US Congress). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.  
 
 40 
Edwards, B. and J.D. McCarthy (2004), ‘Resource mobilization and social movement’, in D.A. 
Snow, S.A. Soule and H. Kriesi (eds), The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, 
Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 116-52. 
 
Federal Bureau of Investigations. (2005). Terrorism Report 2002-2005 (pp. 1-73). Retrieved 
from https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/stats-services-publications-terrorism-2002-
2005-terror02_05.pdf 
 
Frederic F. Manget, Deputy General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, Opening 
Remarks before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Jul. 31, 2002). 
 
German, Michael (2013). Manufacturing Terrorists: How FBI Sting Operations Make Jihadists 
out of Hapless Malcontents, Reason, Apr. 2013, at 54-55. 
 
Giraldo, Jeanne K., and Harold A. Trinkunas. “Terrorist Financing: Explaining Government 
Responses.” Terrorism Financing and State Responses: a Comparative Perspective. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2007. 282-296. 
 
Greenberg, Karen J., Quantrone, Susan (2011). “Terrorist Trial Report Card: 11 September 
2011-11 September 2011,” Center on Law and Security, New York University School of 
Law, 2011. 
 
Gruenewald, Jeff, Brent R. Klein, Joshua D. Freilich & Steven Chermak (2016): American jihadi 
terrorism: A comparison of homicides and unsuccessful plots, Terrorism and Political 
Violence, DOI: 10:1080/09546553.2016.1253563  
 
Holder et al. v. Humanitarian Law Project et al., 561 U.S. 1, 30 (2010). 
 
Jaffer, Jameel & Wizner, Ben (2008). Don’t Replace the Old Guantanamo With a New One, 
Salon, Dec. 9, 2008,http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/feature/2008/12/09/guantanamo.  
 
Knox, G. E. (2014). The Slippery Slope of Material Support Prosecutions: Social Media Support 
to Terrorists, 66 Hasting Law Journal. 295, 303 (Dec. 2014), Retrieved at: 
http://www.hastingslawjournal.org/wp- content/uploads/Goldberg-66.1.pdf.  
 
Landman, S. I. (2010, June 21). Supreme Court Upholds Material Support Law. Retrieved from 
http://www.investigativeproject.org/2019/supreme-court-upholds-material-support-law#  
 
McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (1977). Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial 
Theory. American Journal of Sociology, 82(6), 1212-1241. doi:10.1086/226464  
 
McNulty, J. Paul, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Prepared Remarks at the 
American Enterprise Institute (May 24, 2006), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/dag/speeches/2006/dag_speech_060524.html. 
 
 41 
National Institute of Justice. (2011, September 13). Terrorism. Retrieved from 
http://www.nij.gov/topics/crime/terrorism/pages/welcome.aspx  
 
Norris, J. J., Grol-Prokopczyk, H. (2017). Estimating the Prevalence of Entrapment in Post-9/11 
Terrorism Cases. Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology. 105. 
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc/vol105/iss3/2 
 
Parrott, Neil, Smith, Brent L., Adams, Douglas, Patnoe, Jerry. (2008). “An Analysis of Terrorism 
Financing Court Cases.” Master Thesis. University of Arkansas, Department of 
Sociology and Criminal Justice. Fayetteville, AR, USA. 
 
Patel, F. & Tierney, A. (2015). The Reasons Why Dylann Roof Wasn’t Charged with Terrorism, 
Brennan Center for Justice (July 30, 2015). Retrieved from: 
https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/reasons-why-dylann-roof-wasnt-charged-
terrorism.   
 
Rashbaum, K. W. & Goldstein, J. (2011). Informer’s Role in Terror Case Is Said to Have 
Deterred F.B.I. New York Times, Nov. 21, 2011. 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2011/11/jose-pimentel-a-indeed.html.  
 
Said, E. W. (2011). The Material Support Prosecution and Foreign Policy, 86 Indiana Law 
Journal. 543, 544 (2011), http://ilj.law.indiana.edu/articles/86/86_2_Said.pdf; U.S. 
Department of Justice, Office of the U.S. Attorneys, Counterterrorism Efforts, 
https://www.justice.gov/usao/priority-areas/national- security/counterterrorism-efforts. 
 
Setty, S. (2015). The United States, in COMPARATIVE COUNTER-TERRORISM (Cambridge 
University Press 2015). 
 
Skinner, P. C. (2012) Punishing Crimes of Terror in Article III Courts, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 308, 330–32, 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1647&context=ylpr 
 
Smith, B. L. (2008, July 15). A Look at Terrorist Behavior: How They Prepare, Where They 
Strike. Retrieved from http://www.nij.gov/journals/260/pages/terrorist-behavior.aspx  
 
Smith, B.L., Gruenewald, J., Klein, B., Ratcliff, K., Jackson, S., Brecht, I. Temporal Sequencing, 
Incident Sophistication, and Terrorist Outcomes.” College Park, MD: START, 2016. 
https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CSTAB_ATS_TemporalSequencingIncidentSo
phisticationTerroristOutcomes_Sept2016.pdf 
 
Smith, B. L. (2016). Sequencing Terrorists’ Precursor Behaviors: A Crime Specific Analysis. 
Final Report. Research and Evaluation on Radicalization to Violent Extremism in the 
United States. NIJ Grant No. 2013-ZA-BX-0001.  
 
 42 
Sullivan, Brandon A., Joshua D. Freilich, and Steven M. Chermak. “Financial Crime and 
Material Support Schemes Linked to al-Qaida and Affiliated Movements (AQAM) in the 
United States: 1990 to June 2014,” Report to the Resilient Systems Division, Science and 
Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. College Park, MD: 
START, 2014. 
 
Strom, Kevin, Hollywood, John, Pope, Mark, Weintraub, Garth , Daye, Crystal and 
Gemeinhardt, Don, “Building on Clues: Examining Successes and Failures in Detecting 
U.S. Terrorist Plots, 1999–2009,” Institute for Homeland Security Solutions, October 
2010. 
 
Taxay, Michael (2014). Trends in the Prosecution of Terrorist Financing and Facilitation. 
Terrorist Financing. The United States Attorney’s Bulletin. Sep. 2014 vol. 62, 5. 
 
Taxay, Michael, Schneider, Larry, and Didow, Katherine (2014). What to Charge in a Terrorist 
Financing or Facilitation Case. Terrorist Financing. The United States Attorney’s 
Bulletin. Sep. 2014 vol. 62, 5. 
 
Terrorist Trial Report Card, Center on Law and Security, N.Y.U., 7, 19 (2011), 
http://www.lawandsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/TTRC-Ten-Year-Issue.pdf.  
 
United States v. Goba, No. 02-M-107 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2002), available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/usgoba 102102ind.html. 
 
United States v. Saleh et. al., 15-cr-517 (E.D.N.Y. September 16, 2015) 
 
United States v. Sattar et al., 02-cr-395 (S.D.N.Y. April 8, 2002). 
 
United States v. Shareef, 06-cr-919 (N.D. Ill. December 8, 2006). 
 
United States v. Wright et al., 15-cr-10153 (D.MA June 3, 2015). 
 
Van Bergen, J. (2004). In the Absence of Democracy: The Designation and Material Support 
Provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Laws. Cardozo Public Law, Policy, and Ethics Journal, 
2(107), 107-160. Retrieved from 
http://www.pegc.us/archive/Articles/JVB_material_support.pdf 
 
 
 
 43 
APPENDIX A 
 
Variable Name Description 
Domestic 
Terrorism 
The unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or 
individual based and operating entirely within the United States or Puerto 
Rico without foreign direction committed against persons or property to 
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment 
thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives (Federal Bureau of 
Investigations, 2005, p. V). 
International 
Terrorism 
Involves violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of 
the criminal laws of the United States or any state, or that would be a 
criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States 
or any state. These acts appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a 
civilian population, influence the policy of a government by intimidation 
or coercion, or affect the conduct of a government by assassination or 
kidnapping. International terrorist acts occur outside the United States or 
transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are 
accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or 
the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum (Federal 
Bureau of Investigations, 2005, p. V). 
Successful 
Incident 
Codes when all weapons were delivered to the intended target causing a 
significant amount of damage 
Partial Success Codes when an incident occurred, but the intended target was not harmed 
or the weapon used in an attack failed to detonate or discharge as initially 
intended. 
Unsuccessful 
Incident 
Codes when the incident on the intended target was prevented or failed to 
occur due to plot cancellation, complete device failure, or human 
intervention. 
 
 
